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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACCESS TO
GRAND JURY MATERIAL UNDER
AMENDED RULE 6(e)
Amended rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure codifies theprac-
lice of allowing administrative agency assistance in grand jury investigations. The
amendment seeks to minimize abuse of the grandjuryprocess by establishingproce-
dural safeguards concerning the use of grand jury material in subsequent civil ac-
tions. The author examines thepreamendment case law under rule 6(e) to determine
the effect ofthe amendment. Finding that the amended version does not address such
problems as the scope of the coverage of rule 6(e) or the sub silentio use of grand
jury material, the author suggests approaches to these problems consistent with the
overall objectives of the amendment.
INTRODUCTION
RIULE 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,' origi-
nally promulgated in 1945,2 governs access to grand jury mate-
rial and implements the general policy of grand jury secrecy. In
its original version the rule essentially codified existing case law.3
Controversy arose over the practice of allowing administrative
agency personnel to assist in grand jury investigations since no
specific language in the rule allowed for or regulated this proce-
dure.4 The most recent debate has focused on the extent to which
1. The original version of rule 6(e) provided:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations
and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for
use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter,
stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes re-
corded testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when
so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceed-
ing or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a show-
ing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be im-
posed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. The court may direct
that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has
given bail, and in that event that clerk shall seal the indictment and no person
shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance
and execution of a warrant or summons.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), 18 U.S.C. app. (1970) (superseded 1977); see note 10 and text accom-
panying notes 5-11 infra.
2. See 327 US. 825 (1945) (order implementing Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure).
3. In re Report & Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219,
1229 (D.D.C. 1974).
4. Compare J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Idaho, Nos.
76-1893, 76-1995 (9th Cir. May 2, 1977) with Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Inter-
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
an assisting agency can make use of material to which it was ex-
posed in the course of a grand jury investigation in a subsequent
civil proceeding. The issue of subsequent use raises questions not
only of the breach of grand jury secrecy by disclosure to an assist-
ing agency, but also of the extent to which the grand jury's func-
tion in the criminal justice system may be manipulated for the
investigation of civil violations.
In response to conflicting decisions and requests for clarifica-
tion from the courts,5 the Supreme Court proposed an amendment
to rule 6(e) on April 26, 1976.6 The amendment was to have taken
effect on August 1, 1976. 7 Congress, however, enacted legislation
that delayed the effective date of the Supreme Court's amendment
until August 1, 1977.8 The delay reflected Congress' concern that
the provisions allowing administrative agency assistance might
lead to abuse of the grand jury's investigatory powers.9 Eventu-
ally Congress adopted a modification intended to cure some of the
confusion caused by the old rule as well as by the proposed
amendment.' 0 This modification includes provisions which per-
mit agency assistance, apparently at the discretion of the govern-
ment attorney; require a record of all agency personnel so
employed; and impose a contempt sanction for breach of grand
jury secrecy. 1 This Note compares the standards developed
nal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976), and In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons,
Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See also Note, Administrative AgencyAccess to Grand
Jury Materials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 162 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp.
1098, 1126 n.54 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464,
476 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
6. The Supreme Court amendment to rule 6(e) provided:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations
and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for
use in the performance of their duties. Forpurposes of thir subdivision, "attorneys
for the government"includes. . . such other governmentpersonnel as are necessary
to assist the attorneysfor the government in the peformance oftheir duties. Other-
wise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or
any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in
connection with a judicial proceeding ....
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 94 -
464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (proposed amendment to rule 6(e)) (emphasis added to set off
proposed addition).
7. Id.
8. Act of July 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-349, § 1, 90 Stat. 822.
9. 123 CONG. REC. H3223 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mann).
10. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 6, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 527, 529-30.
11. As amended, rule 6(e) provides in pertinent part:
(1) General Rule. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator
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under the old rule to govern the assistance of administrative agen-
cies in grand jury proceedings with those likely to develop under
the amended rule and identifies problems not addressed by the
rule's modification.
I. PREAMENDMENT PRACTICE
The modern grand jury performs a dual role in the criminal
justice system: it investigates criminal conduct to bring suspects to
trial, and it protects the innocent from unjust accusation.12 Grand
jury secrecy promotes this dual function by permitting control of
information apt to prompt the guilty to flee or cause the innocent
to be unjustly accused in public, and by encouraging uninfluenced
deliberation of criminal charges.' 3 Permitting an administrative
of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for
the Government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph
2(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy
may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing
violation of rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(2) Exceptions-
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring
before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand
juror, may be made to-
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such
attorney's duty, and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney
for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the perform-
ance of such attorney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(i) of
this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other
than assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such attor-
ney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall
promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury
whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom
such disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury may also be made-
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment be-
cause of matters occurring before the grand jury.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e).
12. Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 394 (1959).
13. The justifications for grand jury secrecy were articulated in United States v. Rose,
215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (quoting United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254,
261 (D. Md. 1931)):
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4)
to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information
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agency to assist the prosecutor involves disclosure of material
under consideration by the grand jury to agency personnel and
thus necessitates some compromise of the secrecy policy. Further-
more, allowing agency access to the grand jury proceedings raises
the possibility that the agency will exert influence to turn the
grand jury's investigative powers to uncovering material relevant
to civil violations. The cases decided under old rule 6(e) and the
legislative history of the amended rule demonstrate a continuing
effort to balance the legitimate needs of law enforcement and the
protective function of the grand jury in determining the restric-
tions to be placed upon administrative agency access.
A. The Validity of Agency Assistance
Superseded rule 6(e) provided that disclosure of grand jury
materials be made only to "attorneys for the government for their
use in the performance of their duties."' 4 "Attorneys for the gov-
ernment" are defined in the criminal rules as "the Attorney Gen-
eral, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a United
States Attorney, [and] an authorized assistant of a United States
Attorney . . . ."I' Despite this restrictive language, the courts
generally permitted federal administrative agencies to provide
technical assistance to United States attorneys and grand juries in
the performance of their duties. 6 Early decisions either tacitly as-
sumed the propriety of administrative agency access to grand jury
proceedings or disposed of the issue without extensive analysis.1"
A recent district court opinion,18 however, has comprehen-
with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused who
is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
14. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), 18 U.S.C. app. (1970) (superseded 1977).
15. FED. R. CIuM. P. 54(c).
16. See United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 43 (6th Cir. 1965) (disclosure to Special
Counsel and to Attorney General and the agents of the FBI who were working on the
case); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1123
(E.D. Pa. 1976); In re July 1973 Grand Jury, 374 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (N.D. IU. 1973); In re
William C. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v.
Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 1106, 1116 (E.D. La. 1970) (disclosure to attorney and accountant
of SEC); United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J. 1968) (disclosure to FBI
agents); United States v. Culber, 224 F. Supp. 419 (D. Md. 1963) (disclosure to postal
inspectors). But see In re Holovachka, 317 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1963); In re April 1956 Term
Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956); Application of Cal., 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa.
1961); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 29 F.R.D. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
17. In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956); Application of
Kelly, 19 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
18. Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
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sively reviewed the case law and commentary under the old rule
and its uncodified antecedents. In Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Di-
rector of Internal Revenue, the corporate petitioner was the target
of a grand jury investigating possible violations of a number of
federal statutes, including mail fraud and income tax violations. 19
The corporation sought to enjoin the disclosure of subpoenaed
material to agents of the Internal Revenue Service.2 ° In denying
the petitioner's motion, the court recognized the conflict between
the practical administration of criminal law enforcement and the
desire to maintain strict grand jury secrecy.2' Judge Becker ob-
served in the course of his opinion that practical considerations
often compel the assistance of administrative agency personnel
during grand jury investigations. He noted that in complex inves-
tigations involving, for example, securities or tax fraud, docu-
ments received via a grand jury subpoena "are not generally of
substantial probative value per se,"22 and "[tjo simply deposit the
material in the grand jury room for 23 lay persons to inspect
would be unproductive if not chaotic . . ,. The material must
be examined and analyzed by experts for meaningful evidence
prior to its submission to the grand jury. Yet, as the court recog-
nized:
The United States Attorney's office does not presently em-
ploy investigators, accountants, auditors or persons trained in
the examination and analysis of banking, corporate, business or
financial records. The attorneys on the staff of the United
States Attorney's office do not generally have the time, training
or expertise necessary to conduct detailed and technical docu-
ment examination for investigatory purposes.
24
Consequently, personnel employed by administrative agencies
possessing the requisite resources, experience, and expertise could
better perform this function.'
Against these considerations the court weighed several policy
factors. Because of its role in uncovering crime and bringing sus-
pects to trial, the grand jury possesses extraordinary investigatory
powers-far beyond those of an administrative agency.26 Since
19. Id. at 1102-03.
20. Id. at 1103.
21. Id. at 1104.
22. Id. at 1106.
23. Id. at 1118.
24. Id. at 1107 n.11.
25. Id. at 1106-07.
26. For a comparison of the powers of the grand jury and administrative agencies, see
Note, supra note 4, at 175-83.
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agencies generally do not act under direct judicial supervision and
most often function in an ongoing capacity without vindication at
trial, their investigatory and subpoena powers are more limited.27
The Hawthorne court was concerned with the potential for abuse
since an administrative agency assisting a grand jury would possi-
bly be exposed to material valuable to it in civil proceedings. The
court noted that:
Congress has chosen not to give the agencies powers compara-
ble to those of the grand jury, but rather has fashioned statutes
providing protections for citizens under administrative investi-
gation. That policy is subverted when the agencies have easy
access to kinds of information obtainable only by the grand
jury's extraordinary powers.
. . . [R]estrictions on agency investigation are fundamental
to our liberties. . . . The agencies are denied unrestrained in-
quisitorial powers comparable to the grand jury's because that
kind of power should not be vested in the executive branch.28
Despite these reservations, the court followed what it regarded
as sound precedent and held that administrative agency assistance
did not violate grand jury secrecy.29 Underlying the Hawthorne
decision were the assumptions that agency access would be limited
to providing technical assistance, and that other procedural safe-
guards could be developed to avoid subversion of the grand jury
by civil investigations.3" This approach-allowing agency access
but seeking to protect against abuse through procedural mecha-
nisms-appeared to be preferred by the courts.3 ' Exactly what
procedural controls and safeguards should be employed, however,
was open to considerable dispute.
B. Procedural Prerequisites and Controls
Since the text of the original rule 6(e) did not specifically allow
for administrative agency assistance in the first instance, there
were no provisions establishing controls on the assisting agency's
use of the material to which it was exposed. As the courts devel-
oped the rule allowing agency access, they also developed a vari-
ety of procedural controls. Of particular concern to the courts
27. Id. at 179-80.
28. Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1124
(E.D. Pa. 1976), (quoting Note, supra note 4, at 178).
29. 406 F. Supp. at 1123.
30. See id. at 1125 n.50.
31. See, e.g., J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Idaho, Nos.
76-1893, 76-1995, slip op. at 890-91 (9th Cir. May 2, 1977); In re William H. Pflaumer &
Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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were the type of hearing required prior to obtaining agency assist-
ance, control over the grand jury material during the pendency of
the investigation, and collateral use of the material by the admin-
istrative agency in civil proceedings. In developing the various
procedural constraints, the courts again balanced practical investi-
gatory considerations against the need to ensure the confidential-
ity of grand jury activities. The result inevitably reflected the
individual court's tendency to emphasize the grand jury's role ei-
ther as an investigatory body or as a protector of individuals
against capricious prosecution.
1. Obtaining Court Approvalfor Agency Assistance
The first question in this area was whether a formal rule 6(e)
order was necessary to obtain agency assistance. In many cases
where agency access had been contested, this had not been a ma-
jor issue.32 These cases frequently involved IRS assistance,33 and,
as a matter of internal policy, the Service routinely applied for
formal rule 6(e) orders.34 Whether a 6(e) order was actually nec-
essary hinged on an ad hoc evaluation based on the anticipated
substantiality and duration of the proposed technical assistance.35
In Hawthorne, Judge Becker suggested that an order would be
appropriate if the agency in question were outside the Justice De-
partment,36 if the requested assistance were to be of a continuing
nature, or if the agency had a regulatory or oversight responsibil-
32. Under superseded rule 6(e) it was much more apparent that an order was contem-
plated under the rule's second sentence, involving persons other than attorneys for the gov-
ernment ("Otherwise [a participant in grand jury proceedings] may disclose. . . only when
so directed by the court .... ," Fed R. Crim. P. 6(e), 18 U.S.C. app. (1970) (superseded
1977)), than it was under the rule's first sentence ("Disclosure. . . may be made to attor-
neys for the government . . ..." id.). Nevertheless, the IRS applied for such orders as a
matter of course. See 5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL [CCII], pt. 9267(2) (1977). This
apparently provided the overseeing court an opportunity to control the flow of grand jury
materials during the investigation. See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal
Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1112-14 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
33. See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098,
1126 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("The classical case for the application of 6(e) orders is the I.R.S. or
S.E.C. case ... ").
34. 5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL [CCHI], pt. 9267(2) (1977). The IRS is currently
reexamining its grand jury procedures. See id. at pt. 9267(1).
35. 406 F. Supp. at 1127.
36. Movement of grand jury materials within the Justice Department has generally
been accepted as falling within the rule 6(e) attorney-for-the-government exception. See
id. at 1126-27 & n.56. Cf. J. R. Simplot Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of
Idaho, Nos. 76-1893, 76-1995 slip op. at 889-90 (9th Cir. May 2, 1977) ("absent an expla-
nation for the failure to use qualified personnel within the Justice Department, the Govern-
ment cannot carry its burden of showing that outside personnel are necessary.").
1978]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW V
ity with respect to the activities under grand jury investigation.
Generally, then, Hawthorne was not concerned with the routine
aid of the FBI or with limited exposure of grand jury material to
essentially disinterested government experts.37
The main problem with this approach in deciding whether a
formal 6(e) order was required was its failure to provide a clear
guideline for the government attorney. Judge Becker, writing in
Hawthorne, thought that an order was required when IRS or SEC
assistance was contemplated,38 but there was virtually no gui-
dance for other situations. The safest course for assisting agencies
to follow was to apply for an order in every case to protect them-
selves from claims of grand jury abuse. Such an eventuality
would have a beneficial prophylactic effect. The reason given in
Hawthorne for not requiring a formal order in all cases was that
such an approach would inflict an enormous administrative bur-
den on the United States attorney and the courts.3 1 Yet the neces-
sity of making an ad hoc determination as to whether a formal
order was required in every case in which agency assistance was
contemplated would itself constitute a heavy administrative bur-
den.
If a formal order were required, the courts still had to deter-
mine the nature of the hearing. Most courts required only an ex
parte hearing and a general showing of need for the administra-
tive agency assistance without articulating a rationale for this pro-
cedure.4 On the other hand, in J. Simplot Co. v. United States
District Courtfor the District of Idaho,4 the court held that an
adversary hearing and a showing of particular need for each IRS
agent whose assistance was requested were required under rule
6(e). Simplot involved a grand jury inquiry initiated only after the
IRS had been investigating the civil tax liability of the petitioner
for two years.4' The court concluded that granting the IRS un-
restricted access to the grand jury investigation under such cir-
cumstances would raise "serious due process problems:"4 3
allowing the IRS such an unrestrained head start in civil litigation
against the target of a grand jury investigation would give rise to a
37. 406 F. Supp. at 1126.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1127.
40. Id. at 1107-08.
41. Nos. 76-1893, 76-1995 (9th Cir. May 2, 1977).
42. Id. slip op. at 885.
43. Id. at 889.
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"serious inequity" because the target is not entitled to any infor-
mation concerning the charges against him until indictment 4
Simplot, however, ignored a fundamental problem with such an
adversary approach: it would require the government to disclose
the focus of the grand jury inquiry to the target of the investiga-
tion. This alone would frustrate the ends served by grand jury
secrecy 45 and hinder the efficient and effective prosecution of
crime.46
2. The Aegis Requirement
Once agency access had been granted for the purposes of ren-
dering technical assistance, some courts attached a requirement
that the material remain under the aegis of the United States at-
torney during the pendency of the investigation. 47 This require-
ment included a variety of administrative controls upon agency
access. The procedures suggested by the Hawthorne court in-
cluded the maintenance of a detailed rule 6(e) docket by the gov-
ernment attorney showing the substance of the investigation, the
identities of all grand jury targets and of all agency personnel in-
volved with grand jury materials, and a running inventory reflect-
ing the circulation of the material during the investigation.48 The
primary rationale underlying the aegis requirement was that it im-
pressed upon the agency the limited nature of its access, thus re-
ducing the likelihood of improper use of grand jury material.4 9
Additionally, the records would provide a basis for adjudicating
subsequent charges of improper civil use.5°
These procedures could require substantial administrative ef-
fort. Again, however, the Hawthorne court engaged in a balanc-
44. Id. (citing 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACriCE 16.05[2] (2d ed. 1976)).
45. See note 13 supra.
46. It should also be noted that ex parte proceedings that affect individual rights are
not uncommon in criminal procedure. The granting of search warrants is an ex parte pro-
cedure, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, as is the authorization of wiretaps, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)
(1976).
47. See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098,
1120 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re July 1973 Grand Jury, 374 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (N.D. IMI. 1973);
In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
48. 406 F. Supp. at 1125-27.
49. Id. at 1128.
50. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings on
H. 5864 Before the House Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977) (statement of Judge Edward R. Becker) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings].
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ing process." It determined that "[t]he inconvenience . . . of
compliance would seem outweighed by the prophylactic effects of
these requirements. 52 Although the nature and extent of the ben-
eficial effects of the aegis requirement have been the subject of
debate,53 the court could, in its discretion, tailor the cautionary
requirements to a particular case to reduce any undue administra-
tive burden.
3. Subsequent Use of Grand Jury Material
One of the areas of greatest confusion under superseded rule
6(e) was the determination of the standard to be applied in al-
lowing subsequent use of grand jury information in civil litigation
by those agencies which assisted the attorney for the government.
Even if the grand jury has finished its work by returning an indict-
ment or no bill by the time there is a request for use of its materi-
als in a civil suit, at least one of the objectives of grand jury
secrecy remains pertinent: the need to promote "the willingness of
witnesses to appear and testify fully in the future," free from fear
of reprisal from parties suspected of crime.54 One particularly
troublesome development in the regulation of subsequent use
under the old rule was the disparate treatment of agencies that
had assisted in grand jury investigations and those that had not.
When an agency that had assisted in a grand jury investigation
later sought to use the grand jury material in civil litigation, it had
to meet only a good faith standard. Yet, an agency that had had
no connection with the grand jury investigation was required to
satisfy a more rigorous "particularized need" test.
a. Particularized Need. The particularized need standard
emerged as a judicial interpretation of the second sentence of the
superseded rule 6(e): "Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, ste-
nographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist who tran-
scribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to
or in connection with a judicial proceeding. . . ,.1 Under this
51. See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra.
52. 406 F. Supp. at 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
53. At least one commentator has claimed that the aegis requirement is ineffective.
Note, supra note 4, at 184-85.
54. Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074, 1079 (2d Cir. 1974).
55. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), 18 U.S.C. app. (1970) (superseded 1977). The terminology
"particularized need" was adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Procter &
Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
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test, the party requesting the grand jury material had to show a
specific and compelling need for it that outweighed the policy of
secrecy: 6 Applications for access where the movant was seeking
merely to avoid the delay and expense of normal civil discovery
procedures have been held invalid.5 Ultimately, the standard al-
lowed disclosure as a matter of judicial discretion when the ends
of justice so required. 8
The Supreme Court's clearest articulation of the particularized
need test is found in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.59 In
that case a federal grand jury had investigated possible criminal
violations of the antitrust laws but had failed to return an indict-
ment.6 Subsequently, the Government brought a civil suit
against Procter & Gamble and others to enjoin alleged violations
of the Sherman Act.6 1 The defendants moved for discovery and
production of the grand jury transcript.6 The district court63
ruled that "good cause" had been shown for the production of the
transcript, ordered it produced, and dismissed the complaint when
the Government refused to produce it.6' A divided Supreme
Court reversed the dismissal.6
Justice Douglas' opinion for the majority noted the "long-
established policy" of the federal courts to maintain the "indis-
pensable secrecy" of grand jury proceedings. 6 This secrecy "must
56. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959).
57. United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). See also Corona
Constr. Co. v. Ampress Brick Co., 376 F. Supp. 598, 603 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Application of
Cal., 195 F. Supp. 37, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
58. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1939), a trial judge's
ruling allowing the prosecutor to use grand jury testimony to refresh a witness' memory
without making the testimony available to the defense was held to be within judicial discre-
tion. Id. at 234.
59. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
60. Id. at"678.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. United States v. Procter & Gamble, 19 F.R.D. 122 (D.N.J. 1956).
64. The trial court's holding was grounded on the "good cause" showing required by
superseded Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, 28 U.S.C. app. (1954). The equivalent
provision is now in civil rule 26, which requires a showing of good cause to justify a protec-
tive order limiting discovery. The Supreme Court read the secrecy policy of rule 6(e) into
the good cause requirement. See 356 U.S. at 682-83.
65. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
66. Id. at 682. The Court stated that one goal of grand jury secrecy was "to encourage
all witnesses to step forward and testify freely without fear of retaliation. The witnesses in
antitrust suits may be employees or even officers of potential defendants .... The grand
jury as a public institution might suffer if those testifying today knew that the secrecy of
their testimony would be lifted tomorrow." Id.
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not be broken except when there is a compelling necessity. There
are instances when that need will outweigh the countervailing pol-
icy. But they must be shown with particularity."67 The Court
held that no such showing had been made in the case before it.
The "relevancy and usefulness" of the grand jury material in the
civil case were clearly established;6" that, however, was not
enough. "[T]hese showings fall short of proof that without the
transcript a defense would be greatly prejudiced or that without
reference to it an injustice would be done."6 9 Thus, in order to
obtain the grand jury material for civil use, a "particularized.
discrete showing of need is necessary . ... -7
The Court in Procter & Gamble stated in dictum that the par-
ticularized need test might be met if the grand jury material were
to be used for impeaching a witness, refreshing his recollection, or
testing his credibility.7' The cases demonstrate that a clear need
had to be shown for specific items of otherwise unavailable infor-
mation. A comparison of In re Special 1952 Grand Jury72 and In
re Grand Jury Investigation73 illustrate this point. In both cases
proponents sought the grand jury testimony of witnesses who
failed to recall pertinent information during the taking of deposi-
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 683. It appears that the government attorneys had made use of the grand
jury transcript to prepare the civil case for trial. Id. at 678. The Court stated that if the
prosecution had been "using criminal procedures to elicit evidence in a civil case ... it
would [have] flout[ed] the policy of the law." Id. at 683. The Court's concern, however,
was not rooted in a fear that the grand jury's powers would be used as an improper tool for
civil discovery. See, e.g., Note, supra note 4. Rather, the policy at stake was deemed to be
that of the Sherman Act to ensure that discovery proceedings in civil antitrust cases would
not be cloaked in secrecy. 356 U.S. at 683 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1976): "[Ihe taking of
depositions. . . shall be open to the public .. "). In any event, the Court concluded that
"[t]here is no finding that the grand jury proceeding was used as a short cut to goals other-
wise barred or more difficult to reach. . . . The fact that [the] criminal case failed does not
mean that the evidence obtained could not be used in a civil case." 356 U.S. at 683-84. In
United States v. Pennsalt Chems. Corp., 260 F. Supp. 171, 175 (E.D. Pa. 1966), the Anti-
trust Division submitted affidavits stating that after the Procter & Gamble decision it
"abandoned the practice" of utilizing the grand jury as a means of civil discovery.
Although Procter & Gamble involved a defendant's request for grand jury material, the
particularized need test is equally applicable when a plaintiff seeks the material in a civil
action commenced after the criminal investigation. See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A.B.
Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1963); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
71. 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958) (dictum).
72. 22 F.R.D. 102 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
73. 414 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
[Vol. 29:295
AMENDED RULE 6(e)
tions.74 In the former case, the corporate defendant was able to
show that the witness, the plaintiff, could not even remember the
year of his grand jury testimony.75 By persuading the court that
there were reasonable grounds to believe the material would be
pertinent to developing a defense, the corporate defendant was
permitted to use the grand jury material in the civil suit.76 In In re
Grand Jury Investigation, however, the SEC failed to show a par-
ticularized need for a witness' grand jury testimony;77 the court
was particularly impressed with the availability of other testimony
of the witness even prior to his grand jury appearance and thus
denied the SEC access.7
The secrecy policy and the showing of particularized need for
civil use of grand jury material required under rule 6(e) applied
only to "matters occurring before the grand jury."79 Grand jury
testimony clearly fell within this category,80 but documentary ma-
terial-often crucial in complex tax or securities litiga-
tion-presented further difficulties. Judicial interpretations of
what constituted such "matters" for rule 6(e) purposes varied con-
siderably. One line of authority adopted a restrictive approach,
maintaining that the "[s]ecrecy of Grand Jury proceedings could
not be violated either directly through inspection of the Grand
Jury minutes. . . or indirectly by disclosure of the documentary
evidence presented to it."8 Other courts held that rule 6(e) was
intended to protect against disclosures of what actually took place
during the grand jury proceedings, and when a particular docu-
ment was sought "for its intrinsic value in furtherance of a lawful
investigation.. ,"82 it did not involve a matter occurring before
the grand jury.13
74. Id. at 77; 22 F.R.D. at 103, 108.
75. 22 F.R.D. at 104.
76. Id.
77. 414 F. Supp. at 77.
78. Id.
79. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), 18 U.S.C. app. (1970) (superseded 1977).
80. United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960)
("Rule 6(e) . . . .is intended only to protect against disclosure of what is said or what
takes place in the grand jury room.").
81. United States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D. 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (citation omitted). See
also Application of Cal., 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
82. United Stales v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960) (ICC
granted access to documents adduced before grand jury for Commission's use in adminis-
trative investigation).
83. Id. at 53. Compare Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 771-72 & n.2 (7th Cir.
1977) (by implication) (assistant to attorney for the government ordered by trial court to
return documents to defendant, the original owner, for civil discovery) with United States
1978]
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In Davis v. Romney,84 the court attempted to reconcile these
conflicting interpretations. The Davis court observed that in the
restrictive cases the movants had sought, for example, "all books,
pamphlets, documents, and papers presented to the Grand
Jury,''85 or "a list of documents. . . to be inspected by the Grand
Jury."86 In the Davis court's view, such general requests, framed
around the grand jury's own selection of materials, appeared to be
an attempt to short-circuit normal discovery procedures to un-
cover the course of the grand jury investigation.87 In Davis, on the
other hand, specific documents were requested without reference
to their presentation to the grand jury;88 that the grand jury then
happened to have the requested materials in its possession was
merely incidental. Since there was no effort to discover exactly
what papers the grand jury had, Davis allowed access on the
grounds that the requested documents were not "matters occur-
ring before the grand jury" and thus were beyond the coverage of
rule 6(e). The Davis court's conclusion should not be underesti-
mated. If documents are not considered to be matters occurring
before a grand jury, the government would be allowed virtually
unrestricted access to the evidence, subject only to a showing of
good faith.
b. GoodFaith Rule. As discussed above, an administrative
agency which had not assisted in the grand jury investigation had
to meet a "particularized need" standard to gain access to the ma-
terial. If an agency had rendered such assistance, however, the
courts typically would permit the agency to make use of any grand
v. Saks, 426 F. Supp. 812, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (FTC granted access to documents subpoe-
naed in criminal investigation, the court noting that without grand jury minutes, the docu-
ments alone would not reveal content of grand jury deliberations). In re Grand Jury
Investigation (General Motors Corp.), 210 F. Supp. 904, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), dis-
tinguished Interstate Dress Carriers on the ground that the latter decision was based on the
ICC's independent statutory power to inspect the appelant's records. This factor would be
present in nearly all attempts at access by administrative agencies. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7602
(IRS investigative authority); 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1976) (SEC investigative authority).
More recent cases do not subscribe to this theory. See, e.g., Capitol Indem. Corp. v. First
Minn. Constr. Co., 405 F. Supp. 929, 930-31 (D. Mass. 1975) (access given to a private
surety company which clearly had no statutory inspection or summons power).
84. 55 F.R.D. 337, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
85. United States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D. 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), quotedin Davis v. Rom-
ney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
86. Application of Cal., 195 F. Supp. 37,40 (E.D. Pa. 1961), quotedin Davis v. Rom-
ney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
87. 55 F.R.D. at 342.
88. Id. at 341.
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jury information in subsequent civil litigation. The only con-
straint placed upon this practice was that the grand jury investiga-
tion must have been conducted in good faith by the government.89
The good faith test was first articulated in the context of civil
use of grand jury material by United States attorneys90 and was
later carried over to cover assisting government agencies. 9' By ap-
plying only a good faith test to the assisting agencies, the courts
treated the administrative agency personnel as the equivalent of
United States attorneys.92 To the extent that a United States at-
torney is allowed civil use of grand jury information restrained
solely by his duty to faithfully execute his office,93 the good faith
standard is arguably appropriate for agency personnel. It seems
doubtful that United States attorneys and their assistants are sig-
nificantly more ethical or less subject to executive pressures than
are employees of the IRS or SEC.94 A more concrete justification
for limiting the application of the good faith standard to United
States attorneys, however, lies in the judicial supervision of their
activities, a level of supervision significantly greater than that ex-
ercised over administrative agencies and their personnel.95 Thus,
89. Compare In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) with
Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 239 F.2d 263 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
April 1956 Term Grand Jury v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (7th Cir. 1956); andIn re
July 1973 Grand Jury, 374 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
90. See United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 684 (1958); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp. 197, 202 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
91. In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
92. Judge Becker, the presiding judge in both Hawthorne and Pflaumer, suggested that
the practicalities of agency assistance compel identical treatment of United States attorneys
and agency personnel
[T]o hold: (I) that agents of the IRS may use the documents and records to assist
the United States Attorney with respect to criminal matter,: and (2) that records
and documents may be used for any criminal or civil violations that appear [cita-
tion omitted], but then to say: (3) that the documents and records, when they are
being processed through the agency itself and are beyond the immediate control
of the United States Attorney lose their viability, seems to us to be questionable.
Id at 476.
93. See United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
94. One commentator has argued that administrative agencies should be denied access
to grand jury materials because of the potentiality of executive abuse. Note, supra note 4,
at 179. That writer found the various abuses of administrative agencies during the Nixon
administration particularly telling, citing as examples the IRS's release of confidential in-
formation to the White House and special tax investigations of political enemies. Id. It
was suggested that by comparison, the United States Attorney is more independent of the
executive than administrative agencies and, therefore, could act with greater integrity. Id.
The validity of this argument is suspect, however, given the recent actions of the Carter
administration in dismissing U.S. Attorney Marston. See generaly Jenkins, The Martyr-
dom ofMerit, STUDENT LAWYER at 14 (April 1978).
95. Note, supra note 4, at 179.
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it does not appear that all of the factors warranting the application
of the good faith rule to United States attorneys are present when
an assisting agency seeks access to grand jury material for a subse-
quent civil suit.
The consequence of applying the good faith test to administra-
tive agencies is that it places an almost insuperable barrier before
any party seeking a protective order or suppression of evidence in
subsequent civil litigation. United States v. Doe96 was one of the
rare cases in which a court has found abuse of the grand jury. In
that case the Government expressly admitted its intention to util-
ize the grand jury process to determine civil tax liability.97 Even
when the circumstances surrounding a grand jury investigation
strongly indicate the deliberate misuse of the grand jury as a civil
discovery mechanism, the courts appear reluctant to find bad faith
absent a virtual admission by the government. Consider April
1956 Term Grand Jury v. United States,98 in which the Govern-
ment was found to have acted in bad faith. In that case the Treas-
ury Department had initiated an administrative investigation of a
corporation. 99 Departmental subpoenas were issued, but the cor-
poration refused to comply, asserting that the records had repeat-
edly been made available to the Department.100 The Department
did not attempt to enforce their own administrative subpoenas,
but recommended to the Justice Department that a grand jury in-
vestigation be instituted. The grand jury was empaneled, and it
issued subpoenas essentially duplicating those of the Treasury De-
partment. Meanwhile, eight civil cases were pending against the
corporation. The court noted that the grand jury was not insti-
tuted until after the breakdown of the civil investigation and
found it particularly significant that the Government would not
even disclaim the intention to use grand jury information in the
civil proceedings. These factors led the court to a finding of bad
faith on the part of the Government in its initiation of the grand
jury investigation. As a result, the court barred any use in the civil
proceedings of the information adduced before the grand jury. 10 1
In re William H Pflaumer & Sons, Inc. 02 involved similar
96. 341 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
97. Id. at 1350-51.
98. 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956).
99. Id. at 265.
100. The facts and procedural posture of April 1956 Term Grand Jury are reported in
239 F.2d at 265-68.
101. Id. at 272.
102. 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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facts but reached a different result. Following the petitioner's re-
fusal to comply with an IRS summons, grand jury subpoenas were
issued seeking the same records. 10 3 The grand jury apparently
had been investigating racketeering. Two weeks after the issuance
of the subpoenas, however, it began considering possible criminal
tax violations. It was contemplated that IRS agents would ana-
lyze the subpoenaed records for presentation to the grand jury.
Although the Government conceded the possibility that material
obtained via the grand jury would be used in civil litigation
against the petitioner, the ]4laumer court found no bad faith on
the part of the government in the conduct of the grand jury inves-
tigation. Because a grand jury investigation into other matters
was already in process, the court refused to infer that the grand
jury had been manipulated to generate evidence for the civil in-
vestigation, thereby placing the burden of proving bad faith on the
petitioner. 104
As the foregoing suggests, the protection afforded by the good
faith rule was practically illusory. An administrative agency could
drop its own discovery efforts, permit an ongoing criminal inquiry
to subsume its civil investigation, participate in the grand jury
proceedings, and freely admit its intention to use grand jury mate-
rial in civil litigation against the target-all without breaching the
good faith rule. In fact, as long as the government neither ex-
pressly nor impliedly admitted an intention to develop informa-
tion for its civil case via the grand jury process, there appeared to
be little chance that the court would find bad faith. Moreover, the
strong showing demanded of those claiming bad faith'05 rendered
proof an impossibility since any evidence of an improper link be-
tween the criminal and civil investigations was likely to be in the
hands of the government attorneys and agents accused of the im-
propriety. 0 6 Thus, because the particularized need test imposed
upon uninvolved parties seeking grand jury material was more
onerous than the good faith standard, a curious irony arose: grand
jury targets were provided with less protection when the potential
for abuse was greater.
103. The facts and procedural posture of In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., are
reported in 53 F.R.D. at 466-67.
104. "A strong showing indeed must be made before a court should interfere with the
orderly processes of a grand jury." Id. at 477.
105. See id.
106. See House Hearings, supra note 50, at 158.
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c. Simplot and the Independent Source Doctrine. In J Sim-
plot Co. v. United States Court for the District of Idaho,"7 the
Ninth Circuit formulated new rules to regulate agency assistance
and subsequent civil use of grand jury material. The lower court
had issued an ex parte order under rule 6(e), allowing disclosure
of grand jury information to an assisting agency and containing
no restrictions on civil use.10 8 The appellate court reasoned that
allowing such unrestrained agency access would subvert the sec-
ond sentence of the old rule by permitting disclosure of grand jury
material without the requisite showing of need.0 9 The court held
that in order to obtain the assistance of administrative agency per-
sonnel in a grand jury investigation, the government must demon-
strate, in an adversary hearing, the necessity for each particular
agent's aid, as opposed to showing merely a general need for
assistance. 0 With respect to subsequent use of the grand jury
material by the agency, however, rather than requiring the assist-
ing agency to meet either the particularized need standard or the
good faith test, the Simplot court established a demanding in-
dependent source test:
(1) on appropriate request, the [agency] must identify the
source of its information in a civil case that was preceded by a
grand jury investigation in which its personnel were used to as-
sist the prosecutor in presenting a case to the grand jury; and
(2) upon a motion to suppress in the civil proceeding, the
[agency] bears the burden of proving an independent source for
the information."'
This strict procedure was designed to eliminate certain evils
that the court felt resulted from allowing unrestricted agency ac-
cess. The court maintained that since the sole justification for the
grand jury's powers was the importance society has attached to
detecting criminal activity, the use of grand jury material to estab-
lish civil tax liability was "itself an abuse of the grand jury."'"1 2
The Simplot court feared a "blurring" of the "distinction between
criminal and civil investigations" and the possibility that the
107. Nos. 76-1893, 76-1995 (9th Cir. May 2, 1977).
108. Id. slip op. at 886.
109. Id. at 889.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 890. Cf United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967) (explaining in-
dependent source test: "[wlhether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evi-
dence to which [the] instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.") (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).
112. Nos. 76-1893, 76-1995, slip op. at 888.
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grand jury would be diverted from its proper role to matters more
of interest to the assisting agency.'
13
Although no cases have arisen after Simplot in which the in-
dependent source test has been applied, some far-reaching impli-
cations can be drawn from the imposition of this standard. In
complex areas such as tax and securities fraud, investigation is
typically commenced by the appropriate agency long before the
United States attorney becomes involved. 114 During the course of
the investigation both civil and criminal violations may appear. 15
Under the independent source rule, an administrative agency
would probably be forced to develop the civil case as completely
as possible through its own investigative processes' 16 before re-
questing a grand jury investigation for possible criminal charges.
This procedure would likely provide a sufficient basis for proving
a source independent of the grand jury investigation in response
to a motion to suppress in the civil action." 7 Two undesirable
results may be suggested. First, such a procedure would delay the
expeditious investigation of criminal activity and facilitate the
loss, destruction, or concealment of incriminating evidence. Sec-
ond, it is possible that in the course of the grand jury investigation
civil violations would be discovered for the first time, and because
in such a case no independent source would exist, the target would
escape civil liability." 8 Despite its shortcomings, the Simplot rule
represented an attempt to allow administrative agency assistance,
but to negate the potential for abuse of the grand jury process.
113. Id.
114. "Federal crimes are 'investigated' by the FBI, the IRS or by Treasury agents and
not by the government prosecutors or the citizens who sit on grand juries." S. REP. No.
95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 527, 530.
115. See, eg., In re 1973 Grand Jury, 374 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. I1. 1973); In re William
H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
116. The primary discovery device of the IRS is its own administrative subpoena issued
pursuant to § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code.
117. The IRS reacted quickly to Simplot. Its internal regulations stipulate that:
To prevent doubt about the origins of information available for civil use, in-
formation in the possession of the Service prior to the receipt by Service personnel
of any grand jury information must be identified by preparing comprehensive
records, with appropriate indexes and descriptions, of such information as of the
moment preceding such receipt. Thereafter, any related information obtained by
the Service totally apart from grand jury information should similarly be re-
corded and its independent source identified.
5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL [CCI-I, pt. 9267(2) (1977).
118. The possibility that civil violations would escape notice until a grand jury investi-
gation commences is particularly likely during investigations involving tax fraud or securi-
ties violations where detailed auditing is necessary. See, e.g., Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v.
Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1107-11 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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The drafters sought to resolve the same conflict in amended rule
6(e).
II. PRACTICE UNDER THE AMENDED RULE 6(e)
The amendment eventually enacted by Congress is a modifica-
tion of the original proposal by the Supreme Court. 119 The
Supreme Court's proposal would have sanctioned agency assist-
ance by simply expanding the definition of "attorneys for the gov-
ernment" to include "such other government personnel as are
necessary to assist the attorneys for the government in the per-
formance of their duties."'120 After three days of hearings, 2 ' the
House rejected the Court's proposed amendment 122 on the ground
that it "would allow Government agency personnel to obtain
grand jury information which they could later use in connection
with an unrelated civil case. This would enable those agencies to
circumvent statutes that specifically circumscribe the investigative
procedure otherwise available to them."'2 3 The House concluded
that any change in the rule should await the planned comprehen-
sive revamping of the grand jury. 2 4 The Senate, however, in rec-
ognition of the "increasing need on the part of Government
attorneys to make use of outside expertise in complex litiga-
tion,"' 25 favored the Supreme Court's proposal to allow agencies
to assist United States attorneys during grand jury investiga-
tions. 1 26 The Senate adopted a compromise version which sanc-
tioned agency access but which, unlike the Court's proposal,
attempted to clarify the permissible scope of disclosure of grand
jury material to agency personnel. The Senate version was ulti-
mately approved as amended rule 6(e). 127 As modified, rule 6(e)
establishes a general rule of secrecy in paragraph (1), and sets
119. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.
120. COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 94-464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) (proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)). Superseded
rule 6(e) authorized "disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury ... to the attor-
neys for the government for use in the performance of their duties." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e),
18 U.S.C. app. (1970) (superseded 1977).
121. House Hearings, supra note 50.
122. H.R. REP. No. 95-195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
123. Id. (footnote omitted).
124. Id. at 5.
125. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 527, 529.
126. Id.
127. 123 CONG. REC. H7868 (daily ed. July 27, 1977).
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forth the exceptions to that rule in paragraph (2).128 Among the
more significant departures from the original version are subpara-
graph (A) (ii), granting agency assistance; the last sentence of par-
agraph (1), providing for contempt of court sanctions if grand jury
secrecy is broken; and subparagraph (2) (B), limiting agency use
of grand jury material to aiding the government attorney in his
duty to enforce federal criminal law and requiring that the names
of all agency personnel assisting the grand jury investigation be
provided to the district court. The amendment was initially an
attempt to more "accurately and fully" articulate the law under
rule 6(e). 129 Since the law under the original rule was confused
and marked by contradictory decisions, 3 ° Congress was faced
with drafting a provision that would strike a balance between the
need to promote effective enforcement of the criminal law and the
need to prevent the subversion of grand jury investigations to non-
criminal purposes.'
3
'
A. The Validity of Agency Assistance and Procedural Controls
The amendment ratifies the commonsense approach that pre-
vailed under preamendment practice by permitting employees of
federal governmental agencies to assist the prosecutor, subject to
certain procedural controls. The drafters understood the practical
difficulties of criminal investigations in technical areas: "Often the
prosecutors need the assistance of [government] agents in evaluat-
ing evidence. . . .[I]f. . .investigation is required during or af-
ter grand jury proceedings, or even during the course of criminal
trials, the Federal agents must do it."'' 32 The congressional hear-
ings reveal fairly widespread recognition of this legitimate need to
have experts analyze evidence in complicated securities or tax
cases. 133 Prior to the amendment, however, there was no consen-
128. For the text of rule 6(e), see note I I supra.
129. 123 CONG. REc. H7867 (daily ed. July 27, 1977); H.R. REP. No. 95-195, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1977).
130. H.R. REP. No. 95-195, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 527, 530.
131. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 7-8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 527, 531-32.
132. Id. at 6, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 527, 530.
133. House Hearings, supra note 50, at 21 (statement of Terry P. Segal), 29 (statement
of Judge Edward R. Becker), 66 (statement of Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh), 86 (statement of Prof. Wayne LaFave), 111 (statement of David Epstein),
194 (statement of Prof. Leon Friedman). Even the Simplot court conceded the legitimacy
of administrative agency assistance. J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the
Dist. of Idaho, Nos. 76-1893, 76-1995, slip op. at 886 n.2 (9th Cir. May 2, 1977).
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sus as to whether formal judicial approval was necessary before
the outside agencies could render assistance. 134 In this area it was
clearly the intent of the drafters to eliminate the controversy en-
gendered by the old rule and to avoid the uncertainty which the
Supreme Court's proposal would have generated. 135
One court had interpreted the original rule as requiring in
each case an exhaustive hearing on the propriety of agency assist-
ance.136 During the congressional hearings on the amendment it
was asserted that requiring a court order every time assistance was
sought would result in thousands of applications to the court, im-
posing a burden on the court system which was not justified by a
record showing few abuses. 37 The language and legislative his-
tory of the amended rule indicate that Congress intended to elimi-
nate any requirement for prior judicial authorization of agency
assistance. Subparagraph (2)(A)(ii) states that disclosure may be
made to "such government personnel as are deemed necessary by
an attorney for the government. . . ." There is no requirement
that the government certify to the court that assistance is required.
In the absence of such language the opportunity for court inter-
vention in the decision to obtain assistance appears to be fore-
closed. Comparison of the language of subparagraph (2)(A)(ii) to
that of (2)(C)(i) supports this conclusion: section (2)(A)(ii) stipu-
lates that "such government personnel as are deemed necessary by
an attorney for the government" are allowed access to grand jury
material, while section (2)(C)(i) directs disclosure only "when so
directed by a court." Thus, when the drafters desired the courts to
determine access to grand jury material, they explicitly provided
134. See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
135. See S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 527, 530. The Court's proposal would have allowed agency assistance,
but did not clarify whether the court or the United States attorney should determine the
necessity for such assistance. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 94-464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) (proposed Fed. R.
Crim. P. 6(e)). In a discussion of the Supreme Court's proposal, the Simplot court noted:
"Because of the United States Attorney's involvement in the prosecution of the case, he or
she cannot be entrusted with passing on the necessity of assistance." Nos. 76-1893,
76-1995, slip op. at 890 n.15 (citation omitted).
136. J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Idaho, Nos. 76-1893,
76-1995, slip op. at 889-90 (9th Cir. May 2, 1977) (footnote omitted):
[T]he Government must show the necessity for each particular person's aid rather
than showing merely a general necessity for assistance, expert or otherwise.
Moreover, absent an explanation for the failure to use qualified personnel within
the Justice Department, the Government cannot carry its burden of showing that
outside personnel are necessary.
137. House Hearings, supra note 50, at 56 (statement of Acting Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Thornburgh).
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for such a process.138
The failure to provide clearly for court participation in the de-
termination of the necessity of agency assistance would seem to
compel the conclusion that this decision is within the sole discre-
tion of the government attorney. Furthermore, the legislative his-
tory.indicates that the drafters were specifically concerned with
dispelling any suggestion that a showing of need was required to
obtain agency assistance. 139 Thus, the controversy over the type
of hearing required prior to allowing agency assistance has been
resolved: no such hearing is required at all.
B. The Aegis Requirement
As a procedural safeguard, the new rule incorporates an ele-
ment of the Hawthorne court's requirement that the grand jury
material remain under the aegis of the United States attorney.14
This aegis requirement involved detailed recordkeeping in con-
nection with the circulation of the grand jury material to agency
personnel. 41 Its twin goals were to impress the importance of se-
crecy upon the administrative agency personnel and to provide a
record upon which to act in case a civil litigant later claimed that
the government abused the grand jury process.1 42 The drafters
were impressed by the latter rationale: "In order to facilitate reso-
138. The language of the adopted version should also be compared to that of the
Supreme Court's proposal, which allowed disclosure to "other government personnel as is
necessary to assist the attorneys for the government in the performance of their duties."
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
94-464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) (proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)). In the Court's
version there is a notable absence of delegated authority to the attorney for the government
in the determination of whether assistance is warranted. In addition, subparagraph (2)(B)
of the amended rule, providing that "[a]n attorney for the government shall promptly pro-
vide the district court. . . with the names of the persons to whom such disclosure has been
made," suggests that the court in fact has no knowledge of such disclosure to an assisting
agency until so informed by the government.
139. The Senate Judiciary Committee noted with disapproval that the Supreme Court's
proposed amendment had been interpreted as requiring a judicial finding of need for
agency assistance. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 7, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 527, 530 (discussing J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States Dist.
Court for the Dist. of Idaho, Nos. 76-1893, 76-1995, slip op. at 890 n.15 (9th Cir. May 2,
1977)). The amendment, as adopted, effectively overrules Simplot to the extent that the
case imposed judicial control over agency assistance.
140. See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
141. See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098,
1127 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
142. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
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lution of subsequent claims of abuse,"' 43 the new rule provides
that the names of all government personnel assisting the attorney
for the government shall be promptly supplied to the district
court.'44
This provision should be considered in conjunction with the
contempt power provided in subparagraph (1). The contempt
power has always been available to the courts to enforce grand
jury secrecy. The drafters were aware, however, that it had not
been a satisfactory remedy in the past.145 By making it plain that
the court will employ such measures and by mandating a record
of the responsible agents' names, the new rule could make the
contempt sanction a viable deterrent to breaches of secrecy.
The incorporation of this single facet of the aegis rule does not
render inapplicable the other features enunciated in Hawthorne.
The aegis requirement was rooted in the general supervisory
power of the court over the grand jury14 6 and is not dependent
upon the language of amended rule 6(e). Therefore, the court
could in its discretion order any of the remaining restrictions
47 of
the aegis rule not incorporated in the amendment.
Although additional elements of the aegis standard may be
imposed in this manner, the rule does have some weaknesses. A
court can only dictate supervisory rules to an individual grand
jury148 when it empanels a grand jury or when it rules upon a
petition to quash a grand jury's subpoena. Consequently, the
rulemaking is conducted on a case-by-case basis, resulting in great
variance from one court to another and increasing the burden on
both the judge and the United States attorney. To obtain any
level of consistency in protection, the United States attorney's of-
fice would have to adopt some of the remaining provisions of the
aegis requirement as an internal policy. Thus, at present it ap-
pears that the rule will have only limited impact beyond that sig-
nificant portion written into rule 6(e).
143. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 527, 531.
144. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B).
145. House Hearings, supra note 50, at 90-91 (statement of Prof. Wayne LaFave), 158
(statement of Bernard J. Nussbaum).
146. Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1128
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
147. Seeid. at 1127.
148. Id. at 1128.
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C. Subsequent Use of Grand Jury Material
During the debates accompanying the formulation of the new
rule, concern was frequently expressed about the possibility of im-
proper civil use of material obtained in the course of a grand jury
investigation by assisting agencies. 149 The rule as adopted at-
tempts to allay this concern. Subparagraph (2)(B) provides: "Any
person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii)
[authorizing disclosure to assisting agencies] shall not utilize that
grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting the attor-
ney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty
to enforce Federal criminal law." The drafters regarded this as a
"clear prohibition" upon unauthorized use of grand jury material,
which was subject to the contempt penalty. 5 ' Strict confidential-
ity was contemplated: "A government agent receiving grand jury
information from an attorney for the government. . . is not free
to share such information within the agency which directly em-
ploys him, even though it may be useful and relevant to the mis-
sion of that agency."'' Thus, it was envisioned that the agents
would become exclusive "employees" of the grand jury.' 52
Read in isolation, the foregoing language of subparagraph
(2)(B) would foreclose all subsequent civil use of material ob-
tained by agencies while assisting United States attorneys. How-
ever, Congress believed that the presentation of evidence to a
grand jury should not forever bar its use in civil litigation. The
drafters were aware that the investigation of certain conduct could
lead to evidence supporting both criminal and civil liability. 5 3
They also presumed that assisting personnel would respect the
purpose of the grand jury to investigate solely criminal matters.154
Thus, the Senate report stated: "There is. . . no intent to preclude
the use of grand jury-developed evidence for civil law enforce-
149. House Hearings, supra note 50, at 23 (statement of Terry P. Segal), 36-37 (state-
ment of Judge Edward R. Becker), 46-47 (questioning by Rep. Gudger), 86-87 (statement
of Prof. Wayne LaFave).
150. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 527, 531.
151. 123 CONG. REc. H7868 (daily ed. July 27, 1977). Contrast this with the relation-
ship described in Hawthorne in which agency personnel were apparently expected to report
to their supervisors information uncovered in the criminal investigation. Robert Haw-
thorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
152. 123 CONG. REC. H7868 (daily ed. July 27, 1977).
153. See House Hearings, supra note 50, at 25 (statement of Terry P. Segal); 123 CONG.
REc. H7868 (daily ed. July 27, 1977).
154. See S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 527, 53 1.
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ment purposes. On the contrary, there is no reason why such use
is improper, assuming that the grand jury was utilized for the le-
gitimate purpose of a criminal investigation."15 5 In light of this
legislative history, it is reasonable to conclude that the rulemakers
intended that an assisting agency would be able to use material to
which it was exposed in the course of a grand jury investigation in
a subsequent civil suit under the rule set out in subparagraph
(2)(C): "Disclosure otherwise prohibited. . . of matters occurring
before the grand jury may be made . . . when so directed by a
court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding
. ... " This provision for disclosure only under a court order,
identical to the language of the superseded rule, 156 represents a
safeguard against abuse of the grand jury and was imposed by
Congress to balance the need for agency assistance to grand juries
with the potential for abuse inherent in this practice. 157
As to the standard to be applied in determining whether a rule
6(e) order authorizing civil use of grand jury material by an assist-
ing agency should be issued, the language of the old rule was car-
155. Id. at 532.
156. See note 1 supra.
157. Although it is clear that a court order is required before disclosure may be made
for subsequent civil use, the amended rule, incorporating verbatim the language of the old
rule, does not specify whether the hearing on an application for such an order should be ex
parte or adversary. The legislative history on the point is equivocal; it does not appear to
have been considered in any depth by the drafters. The Senate report states a preference
for ex parte proceedings "so as to preserve, to the maximum extent possible, grand jury
secrecy." S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 527, 532. Representative Mann, on the other hand, noted that the rule pur-
posely left open the question whether the application should be made ex parte or with
notice to the adversary. 123 CONG. REc. H7867 (daily ed. July 27, 1977).
In In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 745 (D. Md.
1978), one of the few cases interpreting the amended rule, the court adopted the Senate
report's position. However, in a number of preamendment cases involving rule 6(e) orders
the hearing was adversary in nature. See, e.g., United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers,
Inc., 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1960); Application of Cal., 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961). In
fact, it appears that at least some courts prefer the hearing to be adversary. Such was the
case in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which the court
denied an initial ex parte application by the SEC for disclosure of grand jury material
without prejudice to renewal on notice to the civil defendant. Ultimately, the court consid-
ered the application upon renewal where the defendant was represented. Id. at 75-76. In
this context, the preservation of grand jury secrecy, adopted as the rationale for an ex parte
hearing in the Senate report and in In re 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, seems inap-
propriate. In the typical instance the judge will examine the testimony or other material in
camera. The movant and opponent, if any, argue whether there may be other methods of
acquiring comparable evidence, and whether it is critical to the case. The material would
not be disclosed to either party at this point. And, as in In re Grand Jury Investigation, the
testimony or other material under consideration will often be that of the civil defendant.
Thus, considerations of grand jury secrecy are not as compelling.
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lied over verbatim to the amended version. It will be recalled that
a dual standard had been developed under the old rule: the re-
quirement of a showing of particularized need by agencies which
had not rendered assistance to the grand jury, and an examination
of the good faith of the government in initiating the grand jury
investigation in those cases in which an agency had been involved
in the proceedings.158 The particularized need test received little
comment in the debates.' 59 The good faith test was explicated
during the hearings 6 but was not met with strong enthusiasm.' 61
It was deemed ineffective because the proof of bad faith was likely
to be in the possession of the government personnel accused of
it. 162
The amended version appears to eliminate the dual standard
and to avoid exclusive reliance upon the largely illusory good
faith test. Paragraph (B) limits agency access to assisting the at-
torneys for the government in the enforcement of the federal crim-
inal law. Thus, subsequent use of grand jury material by
administrative agencies must be had under paragraph (C)(i).' 63
This section adopts verbatim the exception to grand jury secrecy
found in the second sentence of the superseded rule'" which has
been interpreted as requiring a showing of particularized need.165
The Senate report states that "the basis for a court's refusal to
issue an order under paragraph (C) to enable the government to
disclose grand jury information in a non-criminal proceeding
158. See text accompanying notes 53-78, 89-107 supra.
159. During the House hearings the drafters were presented with a proposal which
would have explicitly incorporated the particularized need test into the new rule:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury. . . may be made to the
attorneys for the government for use only in connection with any assistance they
render to the grand jury. To obtain disclosure of grand jury materialfor use by
administrative agencies, the government, at an adversary hearing, must showparticu-
larized and compelling need.
House Hearings, supra note 50, at 28 (statement of Terry P. Segal) (proposed new language
in italics). It is unclear from the proposal whether the particularized need standard was
meant to apply in the determination of the necessity for agency assistance in the first in-
stance or in the decision to allow subsequent use of grand jury material in civil suits. This
proposal was rejected by the drafters.
160. Id. at 36.
161. Id. at 45 (questioning by Rep. Evans).
162. Id. at 158 (statement of Bernard J. Nussbaum).
163. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 527, 532.
164. Both the superseded and amended version provide for disclosure of "matters oc-
curring before the grand jury. . . when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in con-
nection with a judicial proceeding." See notes 1 & 11 supra.
165. See notes 55-78 supra and accompanying text.
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should be no more restrictive than is the case today under prevail-
ing court decisions." 166 Thus, the amended version of the rule ap-
pears to incorporate the particularized need test.
However, in In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury
Investigation167 the court arrived at a different conclusion, holding
that only a showing of good faith was required upon a request for
access to grand jury material. 168 In the course of its decision the
court pointed out a latent ambiguity in the legislative history in
regard to the standard that must be met prior to disclosure. 69 It
noted that the Senate report cited only Procter & Gamble and
Hawthorne7 ° in its reference to what type of showing must be
made upon request for subsequent use of grand jury material. Al-
though the court recognized that Hawthorne required merely a
showing of good faith,' 7I it was unsure whether Procter & Gamble
utilized a good faith test or a particularized need standard.' 72
Confronted with this ambiguity, the court looked elsewhere in the
legislative history for guidance. It finally focused upon the legisla-
tors' disapproval of Simplot's requirement that particularized
need be shown for administrative agency assistance, and reasoned
that since the amendment was designed to eliminate restrictions
on administrative agency access for the purposes of criminal law
166. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 527, 532.
167. 449 F. Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1978).
168. Id. at 751. This case is particularly perplexing in that it did not involve an assist-
ing agency seeking subsequent disclosure of grand jury material for civil purposes, but
rather an independent request by the IRS for disclosure of grand jury materials. Thus, the
case represents a break with those cases which required parties that had not assisted the
grand jury investigation to meet the particularized need standard. Under this approach,
rule 6(e)(2)(C)(i) would be read differently when the government rather than third parties,
including civilian defendants, requested disclosure. Such a result would render the grand
jury almost exclusively a prosecutorial tool of the government, a development at odds with
its historic role and rationale for its powers.
169. Id. at 748-50.
170. Id. at 747 (quoting S. Rm,. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 & n.13, reprinted in
[1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 527, 532).
171. Id. at 749 (quoting Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406
F. Supp. 1098, 1119 n.35 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
172. Id. at 748. The court first noted that Procter & Gamble stated that "[the] 'indis-
pensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings'. . . must not be broken except where there is a
compelling necessity" and "that [this] need... must be shown with particularity." Id.,
(quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)). But the court also
found indications that Procter & Gamble was based upon a good faith test, citing the fol-
lowing language from that case: "[the lower court] also seemed to have been influenced by
the fact that the prosecution was using criminal procedures to elicit evidence in a civil case.
If the prosecution were using that device, it would be flouting the policy of the law."
United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
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enforcement, it should have the same effect on disclosure for civil
law enforcement.173
While such an approach is not devoid of merit, it cannot stand
against a more comprehensive examination of the legislative his-
tory. The House hearings reveal a lack of confidence in the good
faith rule as an effective constraint on abuse of the grand jury.17 4
Moreover, it is clear that the drafters contemplated a showing of
particularized need 175 prior to any subsequent use of grand jury
material by the agency. At no point does the legislative history
indicate a determination to make administrative agency access to
grand jury material for civil law enforcement relatively un-
restricted. In fact, an obvious intent was to limit access to grand
jury material to criminal law enforcement. The proposed amend-
ment imposed no limitation on how the administrative agency
could assist the government attorney. 17 6 Thus, there was concern
that the duties of the government attorney referred to in rule 6(e)
could be interpreted to encompass activities in both civil and
criminal proceedings. 177 The promulgated version carefully stipu-
lates that agency access is limited to assisting "an attorney for the
government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce
Federal criminal law."' 7  This legislative history undercuts the
holding in In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation
that the amended rule does not contemplate a showing of particu-
larized need for use of grand jury material in civil proceedings.
173. In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743, 750 (D.
Md. 1978).
174. In his questioning of Judge Becker, who articulated the good faith test, Represen-
tative Evans asked: "Because the Government proceeds in good faith on what they thought
was a criminal matter and it turned out it wasn't and there was no justification, then by
your decisions or by the decisions that have been rendered you can make a differentiation
between that and a situation in which it was proceeding in bad faith?" House Hearings,
supra note 50, at 45.
175. When questioned by Representative Mann concerning the likelihood that the as-
sisting agency would routinely gain access to grand jury information by making a disclo-
sure request under the second sentence of the original and proposed versions of rule 6(e),
Professor LaFave stated:
I suppose that would happen, but I am not sure that the cases have really broad-
ened the right of discovery quite as much as you have suggested under this latter
provision.
The cases that I am familiar with generally have required a strong showing by
the administrative agency of a need for the material, that there is no way they
could acquire comparable evidence that it is critical to their undertaking, and that
is going to be used in connection with a judicial proceeding.
House Hearings, supra note 50, at 92-93. See also id. at 28 (statement of Terry P. Segal).
176. See note 11 supra.
177. House Hearings, supra note 50, at 93-94 (remarks of Rep. Mann).
178. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
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Once it is concluded that the drafters contemplated a showing
of particularized need to justify subsequent civil use of grand jury
material by assisting agencies, the next issue arising under the rule
concerns the application of this standard in the context of a re-
quest by an administrative agency. Courts have usually invoked
the particularized need test when a party in a subsequent civil suit
has sought grand jury testimony for relatively narrow evidentiary
purposes, such as impeaching a witness or refreshing his mem-
ory. 179 Frequently, however, an agency such as the IRS or the
SEC will be interested not in testimony, but in documents ob-
tained by the grand jury and still in the custody of the court.
While these documents may be sought for collateral purposes such
as refreshing memory or testing credibility, more often they will
be critical to the merits of the agency's case. The precedents con-
fining subsequent use of grand jury testimony to collateral uses
were limited by the constraints of the hearsay rule. However, the
applicability of grand jury secrecy and the admissibility of grand
jury material as evidence are distinct inquiries. 80 Moreover,
grand jury testimony has been used substantively in subsequent
proceedings when it has fallen within an exception to the hearsay
rule.' Thus, the fact that the documents involved will be used to
prove the merits of the agency's case should not affect the court's
analysis of whether particularized need has been demonstrated.
Under Procter & Gamble, disclosure of grand jury material for
civil use is warranted when the need for it outweighs the counter-
vailing policy of grand jury secrecy.182 The strength of the secrecy
policy in this context should be considered with reference to its
justifications. 8 3  When physical documents are sought, rather
than recorded testimony, there is no need to protect grand jury
witnesses from the possibility of bribery or intimidation. More-
179. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, supra note 157, at 888-90; C. WRIGHT
4 F. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 108 (1969).
180. See United States v. Allison, 474 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 851 (1974), stating:
The Government ... argues as if the decision as to secrecy or nonsecrecy under
Rule 6(e) ... determines admissibility. Such reasoning amounts to a legal non-
sequitur. Simply because evidence may be disclosed under Rule 6(e) does not
make it otherwise admissible.
181. See e.g., United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir.
1977) (admissible as a prior inconsistent statement); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62,
67 (3d Cir. 1966) (admissible as recorded recollection).
182. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1957); see text accom-
panying notes 59-70 supra.
183. See note 13 supra.
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over, the owner of the subpoenaed documents is likely to be aware
of their incriminating implications, if any; thus, grand jury secrecy
cannot effectively prevent the ffight of a grand jury target. It is
true that the disclosure of documents under grand jury considera-
tion would publicize the target's entanglement in a criminal inves-
tigation, an event which the secrecy policy seeks to avoid.18 4 Yet,
on the whole, the purposes of the secrecy policy are less relevant
in the context of a request for documents than when testimony is
sought for use in a subsequent civil proceeding.
The requirement for a showing of particularized need prior to
disclosure under rule 6(e) is not the sole protection for defendants
in subsequent litigation. Release of evidence developed before the
grand jury is only proper, according to the Senate report,
"assuming that the grand jury was utilized for the legitimate pur-
pose of a criminal investigation."' 5 Thus, the good faith test re-
mains as a constraint upon subsequent use. What is not clear
from the legislative history is the drafters' conception of how the
good faith test should operate. Specifically, it is unclear whether
the government must bear the burden of showing good faith, or
whether a party opponent in a subsequent civil action must
demonstrate bad faith on the part of the government to prevent
disclosure. On one hand the drafters indicate that "prevailing
court decisions" should apply, 18 6 and therefore, under Pflaumer,
the defendant in a subsequent civil action must show an abuse of
the grand jury process.' 7 At the same time, however, the Senate
report indicates that the hearing on a request for disclosure under
paragraph C(i) will be ex parte. 8 If such is the case, it would
appear that the government would have to make at least a prima
facie showing of good faith.' 8 9 At least one court has followed
184. See Id.
185. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 527, 532 (emphasis added).
186. Id.
187. See notes 105-06 supra and accompanying text.
188. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 527, 532.
189. It may be that the government must present such a showing in all instances re-
gardless of the nature of the hearing. The Hawthorne court, in discussing its scope of re-
view, stated that "'some preliminary showing by affidavit that [subpoenaed matter]. . . is
not sought primarily for another purpose' is required of the government. Robert Haw-
thorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (quot-
ing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973)). Only a minimal
showing need be made for the presumption of regularity of grand jury proceedings to at-
tach. 406 F. Supp. at 1114-15 (citing 507 F.2d 963, 967 (3d Cir. 1975), and In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d at 92 (3d Cir. 1973)). Thus, in an adversary proceeding the
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this procedure in a case arising under the amended rule.' 90 In the
past, however, some courts have favored an adversary hearing, 191
a practice which would resolve the ambiguity and permit the court
to place the burden of showing bad faith upon the government's
adversary.
It cannot be ignored that the grand jury subpoena power may
be used by the assisting agency to steer the grand jury toward un-
covering information relevant to purely civil violations. 192  In
view of the inadequacy of the good faith standard as applied
under the old rule, 93 it is submitted that a court should consider
several factors when determining good faith under the amended
rule. Since any evidence relating to the conduct of the investiga-
tion would be in the government's possession,' 94 the burden of
proving good faith should rest upon the government. 195 The court
should look to whether the party against whom the grand jury
material would be used in the civil case was a target of the crimi-
nal investigation, since a greater likelihood of misuse is presented
when an assisting agency seeks to use grand jury material against
an actual target. Because an indictment at least suggests the exist-
ence of a viable criminal investigation, the court should more
closely scrutinize the proposed use of grand jury material when-
ever no indictments have been returned. Finally, the court should
government must first submit an affidavit making a minimal showing of good faith; the
burden is then upon the defendant to make "a strong showing" for the court to find abuse
of the grand jury process. In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464, 477
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
190. In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743 (D. Md.
1978).
191. See discussion in note 157 supra.
192. See Note, supra note 4, at 162.
193. See text accompanying notes 96-106 supra.
194. See House Hearings, supra note 50, at 158 (statement of Bernard J. Nussbaum).
195. This may not be a revolutionary proposition, as indicated by a brief overview of
the law involving the abuse of the administrative subpoena or summons power. The law in
this area closely parallels that concerning abuse of the grand jury process. An adminstra-
tive subpoena may be quashed if it is used for an impermissible purpose. See, e.g., United
States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953) (IRS subpoena quashed when shown
that it was being used in part to aid a criminal investigation by the Justice Department).
As under the good faith test, the burden of showing an abuse is typically placed upon the
accuser. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); United States v. Litton
Indus., 462 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1922). However, in United States v. Kessler, 364 F. Supp. 66
(S.D. Ohio 1973), the court apparently shifted the burden of disproving abuse to the Gov-
ernment once it had been alleged. In that case the judge asked to inspect the IRS' investi-
gatory ifies after it had been alleged that an IRS summons was used to obtain evidence for
a criminal prosecution. When the Government refused, the court quashed the subpoena, in
effect placing the burden of showing no abuse upon the Government.
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consider the extent of the administrative agency's own civil inves-
tigation 196-that is, whether the agency inexplicably declined to
seek enforcement of its own summons and instead merely turned
the matter over to the grandjury.197 Agency involvement with the
grand jury after unsuccessful civil discovery efforts raises a strong
inference of abuse.
D. The Sub Silentio Use Problem
Underlying rule 6(e) is the assumption that the procedure out-
196. See April 1956 Term Grand Jury v. United States, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956).
197. Until recently the IRS deemed it appropriate to request an open-ended grand jury
investigation whenever an administrative inquiry was stalled by recalcitrant witnesses. 5
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL [CCH], pt. 9266.5 (superseded June 2, 1977 by Manual Sup-
plement 9G-61) provided that:
(1) Occasionally, investigations into areas of noncompliance are stymied by
a series of reluctant witnesses, and it is not possible to determine the precise limits
of the tax violations in terms of defendants and taxable periods. If such investiga-
tions are stymied, and it appears that an open-ended Grand Jury inquiry would
probably develop information which would result in prosecution recommenda-
tions, the special agents should submit a complete report to the Chief ...
(5) If the Tax Division [of the Department of Justice] concurs in the request,
it will authorize the United States Attorney(s) to institute Grand Jury proceed-
ings ....
(7) The United States attorney or the Strike Force attorney will be advised
that jurisdiction of the tax aspects remains with the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice....
Such a procedure approves the use of the grand jury as a tool for civil discovery.
In the wake of J.R. Simplot v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Idaho, Nos.
76-1893, 76-1995 (9th Cir. May 2, 1977), the Service clarified its position, at least with
respect to civil use of grand jury material, by stating:
(2) . . . Grand Jury information is available only to those persons assisting
the United States Attorney. As such, it generally may be used or disclosed by
such agents only in rendering such assistance. Grand Jury information may not
be used for civil purposes without a Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule
6(e) Order which specifically authorizes such information for civil purposes.
(11) While acting as assistants to the attorney for the Government, neither
special agents nor revenue agents may solicit or seek information for other than
criminal purposes.
5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL [CCH], pL 9267 (1977).
The sensitivity of administrative agencies to the grand jury process should still be open
to question. The IRS is but one of many administrative agencies that may be involved in
grand jury investigations, and the others may follow an unwritten procedure similar to the
IRS' superseded "recalcitrant witness" rule. Moreover, recent events may cast doubt upon
the IRS' recognition of the grand jury's limitation to purely criminal investigations. In
General Motors Corp. v. United States, 573 F.2d 936 (6th Cir.) (panel opinion), rev'd on
other grounds, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978) (rehearing en bane), an attorney employed by
the agency was appointed as a special prosecutor to a grand jury investigation. In a letter
to the Justice Department prior to the grand jury investigation, this attorney stated that at
the proper time the IRS would request an order from the court authorizing the disclosure
of grand jury information.
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lined there governing subsequent use adequately protects the in-
tegrity of the grand jury. The possibility remains, however, that
an agency may ignore the procedure prescribed in the rule by fail-
ing to get a court order but nevertheless making use of material to
which it was exposed during a grand jury investigation in subse-
quent civil litigation. One commentator described this problem
during the House hearings:
[A] lot of grand jury material is sub silentio disclosed. It is very
tough for an IRS agent who is assisting the grand jury to then
go back to the IRS, pick up the same case, and even without the
benefit of the transcripts, wipe from his mind all the leads and
information he has developed as a result of assisting the grand
jury.
198
The problem lies in the difficulty of ensuring that administra-
tive agencies are not making derivative use of their grand jury
exposure in subsequent civil proceedings. Agency assistance is
typically required in the most complex of criminal investigations
such as antitrust, securities, and tax fraud prosecutions. In these
complex settings, where voluminous records and transcripts must
be analyzed, it seems improbable that assisting personnel would
be able to recall specific portions for use in an agency investiga-
tion. However, it would be unrealistic to assume that there was no
potential for abuse. Nothing in the amended rule reaches sub
silentio leaks of information adduced before the grand jury; the
only protection from such abuse is the integrity of administrative
agency personnel. And the sensitivity of administrative agencies
to the role of the grand jury as an investigative tool for solely
criminal offenses is questionable. 199
The resolution of this problem may depend upon the, contin-
ued vitality of the independent source doctrine.2" When Con-
gress reviewed existing law under superseded rule 6(e), it never
explicitly considered that portion of the Simplot decision ' advo-
cating that information obtained by an agency during a grand jury
investigation be suppressed absent a showing of an independent
source for the information. The drafters anticipated a process in
which, following a grand jury investigation in which an agency
198. House Hearings, supra note 50, at 23 (statement of Terry P. Segal).
199. See note 197 supra.
200. See text accompanying notes 107-13 supra.
201. See S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 527, 530 (citing Simplot's unprecedented requirements regulating
agency assistance as indicative of "uncertainty" in existing law, but disregarding Simplot's
independent source test).
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had assisted, the government would apply under section (3)(C)(i)
for any information needed for subsequent civil litigation with a
showing of particularized need.202 But when the agency or its per-
sonnel do not follow the anticipated process and sub silentio use
the information, the amended rule is silent as to the appropriate
response. In this context the independent source doctrine might
be helpful. During the hearings, Judge Robb of the Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules indicated that if an administrative
agency attempted to use grand jury material in violation of the
prescribed procedures, suppression of the evidence in the civil suit
would be appropriate.20 3 He analogized to the suppression of evi-
dence seized in violation of the fourth amendment."° Logically,
Judge Robb would endorse the independent source rule as an ex-
ception to the general rule of suppression and place the burden of
proof on the proponent of the evidence. 20 Thus, in a civil trial
preceded by a grand jury investigation in which a plaintiff agency
had assisted, a defendant could force the agency to show an in-
dependent source for the information presented. This would tend
to remove any temptation for administrative agency personnel to
attempt to bypass the rule 6(e) order and the particularized need
test established by the amendment.
E. Matters Occurring Before the Grand Jury
Another potential problem area under the amended rule is the
applicability of the old case law involving documents as "matters
occurring before the grand jury."206 The provision in the
amended rule for subsequent use of grand jury material subject to
a court order was lifted directly from superseded rule 6(e); thus, a
threshold requirement for the applicability of the new rule re-
mains the determination that the material requested constitutes
"matters occurring before the grand jury. 20 7 The legislative his-
tory of the amended rule gives no clue as to how to interpret this
phrase. Prior to the amendment none of the cases adjudicating
this issue involved a request by an administrative agency that had
assisted in the grand jury investigation .2 0  A distinction was
202. See text accompanying notes 163-65 supra.
203. House Hearings, supra note 50, at 95.
204. Id.
205. See generally United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
206. See text accompanying notes 79-88 supra.
207. FED. fL CRIm. w. 6(e)(l), (2)(A), (2)(C).208. This fact may well be a result of the prevailing practice of allowing the adminis-
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drawn in these cases based upon whether the party seeking the
documents was trying to learn what transpired before the grand
jury or was seeking the documents for their intrinsic value.20 9
Courts have used this language in a line of cases to grant access to
documents when it has appeared that the party seeking them was
not merely trying to uncover the direction of the grand jury inves-
tigation.210 It is clear that the drafters intended that no barrier of
secrecy exist between the different facets of the criminal justice
system 21 and that the ability of the government to disclose grand
jury information in civil proceedings be no more restrictive than
prior to the enactment of the amendment.21 2 Prior to the amend-
ment agencies which had not assisted the grand jury were allowed
access to grand jury documents on the ground that they were not
matters occurring before the grand jury.2" 3 Therefore, one could
argue that the drafters desired that an agency rendering assistance
would benefit from a similar ruling. Accordingly, a court con-
fronted with this issue might allow agency access to the documents
on the ground that they are not matters occurring before the grand
jury and not subject to the strictures of rule 6(e).
Though such an approach would remove subpoenaed docu-
ments from the constraints of a rule 6(e) order and its requirement
of a showing of particularized need, it would not eliminate
whatever protection is afforded by the good faith test. The re-
quirement of good faith is not dependent upon a decision whether
or not rule 6(e) is applicable; it is fundamentally a constitutional
decision that can and has been made totally apart from the rule.214
However, relying on the sole protection of the good faith test
would frustrate the attempts of the drafters to provide more than
trative agency to use grand jury material in subsequent civil proceedings subject only to the
good faith requirement. Since this standard was not as onerous as the particularized need
test it was not necessary to litigate the actual coverage of rule 6(e) in these situations.
209. See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.
1960); United States v. Saks, 426 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Davis v. Romney, 55
F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
211. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 527, 530.
212. Id. at 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 527, 532.
213. See generally In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
214. See April 1956 Term Grand Jury v. United States, 239 F.2d 263, 273 (7th Cir.
1956) (holding that the intentional use of the grand jury subpoena to obtain evidence for
civil proceedings was unconstitutional). See also Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of
Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1116, 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (while not expressly stat-
ing that the good faith issue was of a constitutional nature, treating it as an inquiry distinct
from that of whether the government had violated rule 6(e)).
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minimal protection to the individual against government abuse of
the grand jury process. In providing for a showing of particular-
ized need, the drafters sought to offset the potentiality for misuse
of the grand jury when an administrative agency assists in its in-
vestigations.21 5 If courts read documents as not "matters occur-
ring before the grand jury," the amendment would be
emasculated and the drafters' goal lost. Furthermore, there is a
clear distinction between those cases which exempt documents ad-
duced before the grand jury from rule 6(e) as falling outside the
"matters occurring" language and those in which an assisting
agency seeks civil use of such documents. In those cases in which
rule 6(e) was considered inapplicable, the courts were concerned
only with preserving grand jury secrecy; the possibility of subver-
sion of the grand jury's powers toward civil discovery pur-
poses-always present when an administrative agency assists the
prosecutor-was not an element since the party seeking the docu-
ments for civil use was wholly uninvolved in the grand jury inves-
tigation.2" 6 The uninvolved party has no prior knowledge of the
fruits of the grand jury inquiry around which it might frame its
request for documents in subsequent civil litigation. On the other
hand, when an agency has participated in the grand jury proceed-
ings, it is in a position to take advantage of the grand jury's far-
reaching investigatory powers by constructing its civil case around
the information brought forward during the criminal inquiry.
The drafters intended that the agencies not use grand jury infor-
mation for other than criminal investigatory purposes unless a
court order is obtained.217 Therefore, in view of the potential for
sub silentio disclosure, it is unrealistic to suggest that documents
involved in a grand jury investigation in which an agency has as-
215. S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 527, 531-32.
216. In Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1972), for example, the plaintiffs
seeking the documents were homeowners who sued the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development alleging that they were experiencing substandard conditions in houses which
they had purchased through mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Authority. A
grand jury which was contemporaneously investigating possible criminal conduct concern-
ing housing sold through FHA-insured mortgages had subpoenaed certain documents re-
lating to the mortgages. Plaintiffs needed the identical documents for their wholly
unrelated civil case. The court allowed disclosure on the ground that the documents were
not "matters occurring before the grand jury" within the meaning of rule 6(e). Id. at
1339-41. See also United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.
1960).
217. See S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 527, 531; 123 CONG. REc. 117868 (daily ed. July 27, 1977).
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sisted be used in civil litigation without judicial supervision.1 8
III. CONCLUSION
The validity of administrative agency assistance in grand jury
investigations, the procedures for obtaining such assistance, and
the restrictions placed upon subsequent use of grand jury informa-
tion by the agencies were not provided for in rule 6(e) prior to its
amendment. The amended rule clearly validates agency assist-
ance to grand juries and facilitates that process by doing away
with any requirement for a court order as a prerequisite to al-
lowing such assistance. The new rule distinguishes between crimi-
nal and civil use of information obtained in the course of a grand
jury investigation: grand jury material may be used in a subse-
quent civil suit only if a court order is issued upon a showing of
particularized need.2 9 This reflects the drafters' approach in
seeking to balance efficient law enforcement and protection of the
grand jury process. It eliminates or substantially vitiates many of
the criticisms voiced in the Simplot decision of allowing virtually
unrestricted agency access to grand jury materials. Such unregu-
lated access permitted circumvention of the requirement for par-
ticularized need imposed upon individuals and agencies that had
not rendered technical assistance. Since assisting agencies are no
longer excepted from meeting the particularized need require-
ment, the government no longer enjoys an unfair advantage and
can use information only if it meets the same test as any party to a
civil proceeding. The amendment, however, has not met all the
potential problems arising out of subsequent civil use of grand
218. Documents returned to their owner and requested by an assisting agency after the
conclusion of the grand jury inquiry may eventually cease to be "matters occurring before
the grand jury." Nevertheless, the potential for sub silentlo use in the absence of a rule 6(e)
court order would suggest the prudence of applying for such an order whenever materials
which have been before the grand jury are sought for civil litigation. Even if the literal
provisions of rule 6(e) are not applicable, the rule 6(e) court order is not a litigant's only
means of seeking judicial protection. The civil defendant may trigger an inquiry into the
propriety of civil use by an assisting agency by applying for a protective order or filing a
motion to suppress in the civil proceeding.
219. A comparison of the proposed and the adopted amendment clearly reflects the
draftsmen's intent. The original amendment provided that" 'attorneys for the government'
includes such other government personnel as are necessary to assist the attorneys for the
government in the peformance of their duties . . ."; whereas the adopted rule reads,
"[d]isclosure... may be made to... government personnel... necessary... to assist
an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce the
...criminal law ." The addition of the word "criminal" demonstrates the legislators' con-
cern for the preservation of the grand jury's historic role. See notes 6, 11 & 175-78 supra
and accompanying text.
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jury material. The rule does not address the problems that arise
when the agencies do not follow the contemplated procedure. Nor
does it clarify the extent to which documents are "matters occur-
ring before the grand jury." Consequently, in these areas the po-
tential for abuse of the grand jury by administrative agencies still
e~~S2 2 0
exists.o D .
JoHN D. R.-R. KmKLAND
220. Because the amendment addressed a relatively narrow problem in the first in-
stance, it does not reach situations where administrative agencies control grand juries, con-
duct their own criminal investigations, and decide whether to proceed to trial. See United
States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (decided on other
grounds). It does not reach agency use of the grand jury to develop information for its files.
See In re Stolar, 397 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Nor does it reach situations in which
an attorney employed by an administrative agency is appointed as a special prosecutor to
conduct a grand jury investigation. General Motors Corp. v. United States, 573 F.2d 936
(6th Cir.) (panel opinion), rev'don other grounds, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978) (rehearing
en banc).
1978]
